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Case No. 7709 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THELMA EDLUND, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
THE INDrSTRIAL COM~IISSION 
OFTHESTATEOFUTA~THE 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
AND RAWLINGS, 'VALLACE, 
BLACK & ROBERTS, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIF·F 
Case No. 7709 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Plaintiff herein will be referred to as plaintiff, The 
Industrial Commission will be referred to as the com-
mission and the other defendants as defendants. 
All italics are ours. 
This matter comes before the Court on Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari filed by plaintiff on June 7, 1951, on 
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which there was a return by the commission on June 29, 
1951. It arises out of plaintiff's application for work-
men's compensation, which application was numbered 
0. D. 90 by the commission and which was filed on the 
30th of August, 1950. The Industrial Commission hearing 
was held on February 7, 1951, and its decision was dated 
March 26, 1951, application for rehearing was denied 
May 16, 1951. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff for over seventeen years preceding October 
15, 1950, was a legal typist and stenographer. She had 
worked for a number of law firms and since 1944 had 
been employed by the law firm of Rawlings, Wallace, 
Black & Roberts (R. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14). 
In 1947 plaintiff noticed some pain in the end joints 
of her fingers as she typed. The pain was not so severe 
as to be disabling, but all of the fingers with the excep-
tion of the thumb on the left hand became swollen (R.14). 
Plaintiff was working a five and a half day week 
and during four hours of each day she was typing con-
stantly (R. 13). The thumb of the left hand was not in 
any way used by plaintiff in her typing work, and it was 
the only digit in which there was no swelling and no 
soreness. In each of the other eight fingers and thumb 
there was a swelling, soreness and a bony nodular growth, 
which increased in size from 1948 on (R. 15, 16). 
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The legal work 'vhich plaintiff perfonned over the 
seyenteen years required the typing of large numbers 
of carbon copies and as a consequence the force with 
which plaintiff necessarily struck the keys of the type-
writer was greater than would normally be the case in 
an ordinary typing operation (R. 13, 14). The only place 
where there was any soreness, swelling or nodular growth 
on plaintiff's hands or other joints of her body was at 
the end joint of the nine fingers of her hands. No other 
joint of plaintiff's hand was in any way sore or involved 
in nodular growth. The shock caused to the hands by 
typing operations travels through the end of the fingers 
and into the first joint of each finger. The place where 
the nodules on the right thumb appeared was at the point 
where plaintiff's right thumb struck the space bar as 
she used it in typing (R. 15 and 24). Plaintiff had never 
had any rheumatism, stiffness of the joints or other 
similar pains or ailments during the seventeen years she 
worked as a legal stenographer. The nodules or bony 
growths on the end joints of plaintiff's nine fingers first 
appeared in 1948 (R. 16). In 1949 plaintiff consulted a 
physician concerning her hands. Pain in the fingers con-
tinued to increase in intensity and seemed to be more 
severe at the end of a lot of typing. The only times that 
plaintiff was relieved from pain in her fingers was dur-
:V~: ing her vacation when she was not working (R. 17). The 
ur• aggravation and increase in the intensity of the pain 
nJ~ continued until plaintiff was forced to quit her work on 
;; October 15, 1950 (R. 17, 18). Since plaintiff ceased her 
·oi employment she has noticed that her fingers are not 
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nearly as painful as they were and that the nodulations 
have not increased in size. The soreness and tenderness 
on pressure on the end joints of plaintiff's fingers has 
also decreased in its intensity (R.12 and 23). 
Three doctors appeared as witnesses, two for plain-
tiff and one for defendants. There is no real conflict in 
their testimony. Dr. Beech testified that he found no 
abnormal conditions in plaintiff except the end joints 
of her fingers, which showed on x-ray the bony growths 
and narrowing of the joint space at the distal joint on 
nine of plaintiff's ten fingers. He diagnosed the condi-
tion as osteoarthritis, a disease involving the cartilage 
on the joint on the ends of plaintiff's fingers (R. 31). Dr. 
Beech stated that the causes of the disease are not known, 
but two causes are rather well accepted. They are age 
and injury (R. 31). Plaintiff was the first patient Dr. 
Beech had ever seen whose complaint was primarily 
osteoarthritis, although he had observed the condition in 
a number of other persons. He stated frankly that there 
was no authority who claims to know the cause of plain-
tiff's arthritic condition. However, it is well accepted 
that injury may cause a deformity of the fingers similar 
in appearance to the deformity of plaintiff's fingers. He 
was definite that trauma is considered one of the primary 
causes of the disease (R. 33). For example, the growth 
which results from the fingers being struck by a base-
ball (R. 36). He also testified that typing can be con-
sidered a form of trauma. He was somewhat surprised 
that the type of disease found in plaintiff's fingers was 
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not seen more often in typists. There was no doubt that 
the nodulation or arthritis in plaintiff's fingers could be 
caused by the direct trauma resulting from the striking 
of the typewriter keys (R. 37). 
Dr. L. Gurr :J[cQuarrie, plaintiff's general physician 
and surgeon, who treated the condition of plaintiff's 
hands for approximately two years, stated his opinion 
concerning the condition of plaintiff's hands. He said 
(R. -!2) : 
"A. Yes, my opinion is that the type of work 
she does and the stress and strain would definitely 
be a causative factor in the development of the 
osteoarthritis; not the total cause but the contri-
buting cause of it." 
Dr. Norman R. Beck, a specialist in orthopedic 
surgery, testifying on behalf of plaintiff stated that 
osteoarthritis is considered to be a degenerative disease, 
the etiology is not definitely known. It causes a degenera-
tion of the cartilage in the joint and overgrowth of the 
bone adjacent to it (R. 46). Several factors contribute 
to development of osteoarthritis, one being heredity. 
Trauma is another causative factor which may cause 
arthritis to develop in an .individual. at a younger age 
than would otherwise be the fact (R. 46). 
In regard to the heredity of plaintiff, she testified 
that many of her relatives have lived their full three 
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score and ten years and no one in her family that she 
knew of had ever been afflicted with arthritis, rheuma-
tism or arthritic conditions of their joints (R. 48, 49). 
Concerning the types of trauma which could be a 
cause of arthritis, Dr. Beck stated as follows (R. 49, 50): 
"A. Well, nobody knows definitely what 
causes arthritis. Trauma sometimes is a cause, 
severe trauma is mentioned as a possibility; re-
peated minor insults to a joint; normal use, and 
wear and tear. My personal feelings, as I men-
tioned before, if they had a predisposition. If it 
is not in a person's heredity then you definitely 
rule out that fact. Repeated trauma, minor trau-
mas and insults conceivably could result in arthri-
tis at an earlier age." 
The x-rays of plaintiff's hands showed a definite 
nodular growth on all of her fingers and on her right 
thumb, but there was no nodular growth shown on the 
left thumb. 
Plaintiff's claim is presented under Sec. 42-1a-28, 
Utah Code .Annotated, 1943, as amended by Laws of 
1949, Senate Bill 288, which was approved and in effect 
March 5, 1949. Subsection (28) of Section 28 was added 
by the amendment of 1949. It reads as follows: 
"(28) Such other diseases or injuries to health 
which directly arise as a natural incident of 
the exposure occasioned by the employment, 
provided, however, that such a disease or 
injury to health shall be compensable only 
in those instances where it is shown by 
the employee or his dependents that all of 
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the following nmned circun1stances were 
present: ( 1) a dirert causal connection 
between the conditions under which the 
work is performed and the disease or injury 
to health; (2) the disease or injury to 
health can be seen to have followed as a 
natural incident of the work as a result of 
the exposure occasioned by the employ-
ment; (3) the disease or injury to health 
can be fairly traced to the employment as 
to the proximate cause; ( 4) the disease or 
injury to health is not of a character to 
which the employee may have had substan-
tial exposure outside of the employment ; 
( 5) the disease or injury to health is inci-
dental to the character of the business and 
not independent of the relation of the em-
ployer and employee ; and ( 6) the disease 
or injury to health must appear to have 
had its origin in a risk connected with the 
employment and to have flowed from that 
source as a natural consequence, though it 
need not have been foreseen or expected 
before discovery. No disease or injury to 
health shall be found compensable where it 
is of a character to which the general public 
is commonly exposed." 
The commission in its Findings of F·act and Con-
clusions of Law, while not finding that there was a direct 
causal connection between the conditions under which 
plaintiff worked and her physical condition, assumed 
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such causal relationship (R. 56). The commission then 
stated that it was the applicant's burden to establish (R. 
56): 
"* * * (1) that the disease or injury to health 
can be seen to have followed as a natural incident 
of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned 
by the employment, (2) the disease or injury to 
health is incidental to the character of the busi-
ness and not independent of the relation of em-
ployer and employee, ( 3) the disease or injury to 
health must appear to have had its origin in a 
work connected with the employment and to have 
flowed from that source as a natural consequence 
although it need not have been foreseen before dis-
covery and ( 4) that the disease or injury to health 
for which she seeks compensation is not of a 
character to which the general public is commonly 
exposed." 
It then states, apparently as a conclusion of law, that 
the legislature only intended to make compensable those 
diseases which could be recognized as commonly asso-
ciated with a particular employment, citing as an ex-
ample silicosis (R. 56). 
As final grounds for denying plaintiff the benefit 
of the occupational disease act, the referee states as 
follows (R. 57): 
"It is the referee's opinion, and he so finds, 
that the disease for which compensation is claimed 
is not an occupational disease. It is not the custo-
mary and usual result in the typing occupation." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
SU:M~IARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY MISCONSTRUED 
THE l\IEANING AND PURPOSE OF SECTION 42-la-28 (28) 
AND UNLAWFULLY DENIED PLAINTIFF HER DISA-
BILITY COMPENSATION. 
(1) WAS THERE A DIRECT CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN 
THE CONDITION UNDER WHICH PLAINTIFF'S WORK WAS PERFORMED 
AND THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HER HEALTH? 
(2) THE DISEASE AND INJURY TO HEALTH CAN BE SEEN TO 
HAVE FOLLOWED AS A NATURAL INCIDENT OF THE WORK AS A RESULT 
OF EXPOSURE OCCASIONED BY THE EMPLOYMENT. 
(3) THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HEALTH CAN BE FAIRLY 
TRACED TO THE EMPLOYMENT AS A PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
(4) THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HEALTH IS NOT OF A CHAR-
ACTER TO WHICH THE EMPLOYEE MAY HAVE HAD SUBSTANTIAL EX-
POSURE OUTSIDE OF THE EMPLOYMENT. 
(5) THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HEALTH IS INCIDENTAL TO 
THE CHARACTER OF THE BUSINESS AND NOT INDEPENDENT OF THE 
RELATION OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE. 
(6) THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HEALTH MUST APPEAR TO 
HAVE HAD ITS ORIGIN IN A RISK CONNECTED WITH THE EMPLOY-
MENT AND TO HAVE FLOWED FROM THAT SOURCE AS A NATURAL 
CONSEQUENCE, THOUGH IT NEED NOT HAVE BEEN FORESEEN OR 
EXPECTED BEFORE DISCOVERY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY MISCONSTRUED 
THE MEANING AND PURPOSE OF SECTION 42-la-28 (28) 
AND UNLAWFULLY DENIED PLAINTIFF HER DISA-
BILITY COMPENSATION. 
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Plaintiff's appeal is a case of first impression under 
Subsection (28) of Sec. 42-la-28. Plaintiff's research has 
failed to reveal any similar section which has been inter-
preted in any neighboring jurisdictions. Such help as 
can be found must be supplied strictly by analogy. 
By taking each of the numbered requirements in 
subsection (28) and applying the requirement to the 
evidence in plaintiff's action, plaintiff will attempt to 
demonstrate that she qualifies under each and every 
provision. 
( 1) WAS THERE A DIRECT CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN 
THE CONDITION UNDER WHICH PLAINTIFF'S WORK WAS PERFORMED 
AND THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HER HEALTH? 
The question above must be answered in the affirma-
tive. The commission while not finding that there was a 
direct causal connection, assumed that such direct causal 
connection existed. Under the evidence a finding was 
mandatory that there was such a direct causal connection. 
Any other finding would be contrary to all of the evidence 
which was presented. Dr. Beech, who was produced by 
the defendant, Insurance Fund, and for whose testimony 
that organization vouches, stated 'that in his opinion 
such a causal connection would exist. A finding that 
no causal connection existed in the face of the evidence 
that the only joints in plaintiff's whole body which were 
affected by the arthritis were the eight end joints of 
plaintiff's fingers and the thumb of her right hand, would 
be arbitrary and capricious. The joints affected were the 
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only joints subjected to the repeated traumatic injury 
caused by the striking of the fingers and thumb against 
the keys of the typewriter. If the arthritic condition 
steins from some other cause, why is it that no other 
joint in plaintiff's hands was affected 1 There are two 
other joints in the same fingers in which the single joint 
is affected. 
(2) THE DISEASE AND INJURY TO H.EM-TH CAN BE SEEN TO 
HAVE FOLLOWED AS A NATURAL INCIDENT OF THE WORK AS RESULT 
OF EXPOSURE OCCASIONED BY THE EMPLOYMENT. 
Under the present facts it is difficult to see exactly 
how the second requirement differs materially from the 
first requirement. Of course, having a causal connection 
and being the kind of ailment which is a result of the 
shock and traumatic injury to plaintiff's fingers, acting 
through the state of her health and the tissues, bones, 
tendons and muscles of her fingers, the disease with 
which she is afflicted could only be a natural incident of 
the work to which she was exposed by her employment. 
The word "natural" has no different legal meaning than 
its use in the vernacular. Black's Law Dictionary, Third 
Edition, p. 1222. 
(3) THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HEALTH CAN BE FAIRLY 
TRACED TO THE EMPLOYMENT AS A PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
It will be recalled that the only times when plain-
tiff did not have aggravation of the condition of her 
fingers and the only times when she did not have pain 
in her fingers were when she was not engaged in the 
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usual work of her employment, namely, typing. As far as 
proximate cause is concerned, there was no intervening 
agency of any kind which occurred between the incident 
or injury, namely, the traumatic impact of plaintiff's 
fingers against the typewriter keys, and the disease from 
which she suffered. The force applied to the hands of 
her fingers traveled only to the first joint of her fingers 
and there caused the abnormal and diseased condition 
of the tissues and joints. A more direct close proximate 
causation situation could hardly be imagined. When the 
words proximate cause are used, it is assumed that the 
legislature intended those words to mean the same as 
they normally mean in our legal vocabulary. We have 
long accepted proximate cause as meaning that cause, 
which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken 
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, 
and without which the result would not have occurred. 
Black's ·Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 1457. We 
recognize proximate cause as the efficient cause, 
the producing cause, the one that necessarily sets the 
other causes in operation. 
(4)· THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HEALTH IS NOT OF A CHAR-
ACTER TO WHICH THE EMPLOYEE MAY HAVE HAD SUBSTANTIAL EX-
POSURE OUTSIDE OF THE EMPLOYMENT. 
Considerable testimony was elicited, both by plain-
tiff and defendants, concerning plaintiff's activities and 
the possibility that ringing out washcloths or dish towels 
might in some way contribute to or affect the condition 
of plaintiff's hands. All attempts to show that outside 
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factors enter in any way into the picture of causation 
failed. The nature of plaintiff's injuries and the places 
on her fingers which are affected, for all practical pur-
poses, eliminates any kind of normal activity as a causa-
tive factor. There is no household work which results 
in force being applied to the ends of a person's fingers; 
there is no outside engagement of any kind in which 
plaintiff was involved which could possibly affect only 
the end joints of plaintiff's fingers. Activities such as 
using a broom or dusting or washing dishes, require the 
use of all of the joints in the fingers and hands. 
(5) THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HEALTH IS INCIDENTAL TO 
THE CHARACTER OF THE BUSINESS AND NOT INDEPENDENT OF THE 
RELATION OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE. 
Plaintiff's employment as a legal stenographer re-
quired the devotion of at least four hours per day to con-
tinuous typing. This activity was on manual operating 
typewriters and in the work a great many extra carbon 
copies were necessary. All of these facts are very mate-
rial. They explain, perhaps, why arthritis developed in 
plaintiff's hands, while many other typists do not become 
:o- afflicted with the disease. In the typing of carbons, it 
is necessary that an extra amount of force be used in 
striking the keys. This force, which the medical profes-
sion recognizes as trauma and which Dr. Beech described 
as repeated insults to the end joints of plaintiff's fingers, 
all were incidental to the character of the business and 
were dependent on the relation of employer and em-
ployee. No other place, except in her employment as a 
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typist, was plaintiff exposed to this type of injury. This 
is not the situation which this court discussed in Tavey 
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 106 Utah 489, 150 P. 
2d 379, where the employee's dizziness had no connection 
and was entirely independent of the relation of employer 
and employee. Here all of the detrimental injurious ef-
fects flow from the basic cause of plaintiff's condition, 
namely, the typing activity in which she engaged while 
on the job. 
(6) THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HEALTH MUST APPEAR TO 
HAVE HAD ITS ORIGIN IN A RISK CONNECTED WITH THE EMPLOY-
MENT AND TO HAVE FLOWED FROM THAT SOURCE AS A NATURAL 
CONSEQUENCE, THOUGH IT NEED NOT HAVE BEEN FORESEEN OR 
EXPECTED BEFORE DISCOVERY. 
The origin of plaintiff's disease was, of course, a risk 
connected with her employment. There was always the 
risk that some person employed in typing by defendants, 
because of the repeated traumatic injury caused by strik-
ing the typewriter keys, might incur the disease of 
arthritis. It is not necessary that this particular disease 
or condition have been foreseen, and perhaps if plain-
tiff's case were the first time that arthritis of the fingers 
was caused by typing, such a result could not have been 
foreseen, but as requirement No. 2 states, foreseeability 
is not necessary. The risk being present, regardless of 
whether it was known or unknown, if the disease flowed 
from the risk as a natural consequence, then it is com-
pensable. 
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Subsection ~8 states that no disease or injury to 
health shall be found cmnpensable where it is of a char-
acter to which the general public is commonly exposed. 
Regarding this particular requirement, it is, of course, 
only a sn1all group of the public who would in any way 
be exposed to the kind of disease from which plaintiff 
suffers, and an even smaller percentage of the typists 
who were exposed would incur the disease which afflicted 
plaintiff. The general public is not commonly typing 
four hours a day in an employment which requires the 
making of large number of carbon copies. 
It is difficult to conceive of a diseased condition 
which more fully conforms to the requirements of Sub-
section (28) than does plaintiff's condition. The In-
dustrial Commission, however, thought that an additional 
requirement was tacked on to the language of Subsection 
(28). It concluded that before plaintiff could recover, the 
disease must also be a recognized occupational disease, 
such as silicosis. This conclusion, plaintiff submits, is 
obviously erroneous. Section 42-la-28 lists a number of 
occupational diseases. Perhaps the list is not exhaustive, 
but if it is not, it was intended to be as exhaustive as 
was possible at the time the law was drawn. Subsection 
(28) is the catchall section. It, plaintiff submits, was 
intended to provide compensation for diseases and in-
juries to health which were not recognized as occupa-
tional diseases, but which nevertheless grew out of the 
occupation in which the injured employee was working. 
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Subsection (28) does not say "such other occupa-
tional diseases or injuries to health which directly arise," 
etc. It says "such other diseases or injuries to health 
which directly arise," etc. If the legislature intended to 
still limit compensation to known recognized occupational 
diseases, the logical, common sense way to accomplish 
that end would be to add to the list of diseases contained 
in Section 28. 
When the legislature left out the modifying word 
"occupational" in Subsection (28), it, plaintiff submits, 
opened the benefits for all diseases or injuries to health 
that could meet the qualifications set down and numbered 
( 1) to ( 6) in the subsection. 
As a conclusion of law the commissiOn states as 
follows what it considers to be the legislature's intention: 
"The legislature clearly intended to make 
compensable only those diseases which can be 
recognized as commonly associated with a particu-
lar employment, as silicosis is associated with 
metal mining." 
If such were the intention of the legislature, sub-
section (28) is a most clumsy way of accomplishing that 
end. The diseases which can be recognized as· commonly 
associated with a particular employment are listed in 
the other subsections of Section 28. By subsection (28) 
the legislature, plaintiff submits, intended to broaden 
and expand the types of diseases and injuries to health 
for which compensation should be paid. The conclusion 
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of law quoted would defeat any such intention. It would 
place upon a claimant the great and probably insur-
mountable burden of proving that the disease from which 
she suffered was one which was commonly associated 
with her employ1nent. How great an incident of the dis-
ease would be necessary before it became commonly 
associated with an employment? Where would the claim-
ant find statistics to show the frequency with which 
arthritis occurred among typists employed four hours a 
day in constant typing where large numbers of carbon 
copies were required 1 Certainly the right to compensa-
tion which was granted in subsection (28) would mean 
very little to any employee if such is the requirement. 
The right, plaintiff submits, would be a myth and an 
illusion. The burden of showing common association or 
that the disease was a customary or usual result of the 
employment would be insurmountable and unbearable. 
The State of Washington has a unique provision, but 
somewhat analogous to subsection (28). Their statute 
provides for occupational disease benefits for all dis-
eases or infections which arise naturally and proximately 
out of the extra-hazardous employment in which the 
employee was engaged. No specific occupational diseases 
are listed. 
TheW ashington Supreme Court in Simpson Logging 
Co. v. Department of Labor and Industries, 32 Wash. 2d 
472, 202 P. 2d 448, interpreted the meaning of the act. 
The employee had incurred the disease of asthma from 
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breathing dust, smoke and fumes which accumulated at 
the place where he tended a certain paper machine in the 
plant of his employer. The Washington Department of 
Labor and Industry awarded plaintiff compensation. 
The employer appealed on two grounds: (a) That the 
claimant was not suffering from asthma; and (b) that 
asthma was not a compensable occupational disease under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act of Washington. The 
Supreme Court ruled that the evidence was sufficient 
as to the nature of his ailment and then discussed the 
question of whether or not asthma could be considered 
as the type of injury for which the occupational disease 
benefits were intended. In the discussion of the law the 
following principles were set forth at page 452: 
"The intent of the legislature must be drawn 
from the language used in the present statute. De-
cisions interpreting dissimilar statutes or the com-
mon law can be of little assistance to us. There 
is nothing in the language of the present statute, 
defining occupational disease as, 'occupational 
disease' means such disease or infection as arises 
naturally and proximately out of extra-hazardous 
employment," that would warrant reading into it 
the tests of the Seattle Can Co. case. The legis-
lature is presumed to have been familiar with the 
meaning of "proximate cause" as used by the 
courts, and that being so, when they are defined as 
an occupational disease those diseases or infec-
tions as arise naturally and proximately out of 
extra-hazardous employment, it would follow that 
they meant that the condition of the extra-
hazardous employment must be the proximate 
cause of the disease for which claim for compensa-
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tion is made, and that the cause 1nust be proximate 
in the sense that there existed no intervening in-
dependent and sufficient cause for the disease, 
so that the disease would not have been contracted 
but for the condition existing in the extra-hazard-
ous employment. Under the present act no dis-
ease can be held not to be an occupational disease 
as a matter of law where it has been proved that 
the conditions of the extra-hazardous employment 
in which the claimant was employed naturally and 
proximately produced the disease and that but for 
the exposure to such conditions the disease would 
not have been contracted." 
The Industrial Commission in its conclusion in the 
present case is attempting to say that unless the injury 
to health or disease from which an employee suffers is 
a recognized occupational disease or is one which is 
commonly and usually found in the occupation in which 
plaintiff was working, no compensation can be awarded. 
Why such an interpretation is made, it is impossible 
to understand. No part of the language of Subsection 
(28) will stand such an interpretation. In line with the 
liberal hwnane purposes of occupational disease acts 
and worlanen's compensation generally, the exact oppo-
site interpretation of subsection (28) should be required. 
The language of the section shows an intent on the part 
of the legislature to provide compensation for the numer-
ous diseases and afflictions which were neither known 
or commonly recognized occupational diseases. The only 
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thing they thought should be the requirement is that the 
disease or injury to health flowed directly, naturally and 
proximately from the employment in which the employee 
was engaged. 
What could be more just and equitable than to re-
quire the industry which was the cause of the disease to 
bear the burden and loss caused by the disease. 
We have long ago recognized that justice requires 
the spreading of the cost of injury incurred in an in-
dustry. Only the industry can pass the loss on and dis-
tribute it among large numbers of people. Should it 
make any difference whether the particular injury is a 
recognized occupational disease or only one which arises 
so infrequently as not to be commonly recognized as 
occupational1 Plaintiff submits that the legislature in-
tended to cover all diseases and injuries to health that 
arise naturally and proximately out of the injured em-
ployee's work, and this court should promote and not 
defeat this humane equitable purpose. 
Plaintiff submits that the result reached by the 
Washington Court in the Simpson Logging Co. case is the 
liberal humane interpretation that this court should 
adopt. It should announce that under our act "no dis-
ease can be held not to be an occupational disease as a 
matter of law where it has been proved that the condi-
tions of the * * * employment' in which the claimant was 
employed naturally and proximately produced the dis-
ease." 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that this court should 
determine that the decision of The Industrial Commis-
sion is in excess of its powers and that plaintiff is en-
titled to an award of full con1pensation for the disability 
which she has suffered as a result of the arthritic condi-
tion of the fingers of her hands. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DWIGHT L. KING, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
530 Judge Buildin~ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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